This paper offers new evidence on the sources of cross-country income differences. It exploits the idea that observing immigrant workers from different countries in the same labor market provides an opportunity to estimate their relative human capital endowments without having to adjust for other sources of country-specific productivity differences. Based on such estimates, a neoclassical growth model with human capital is used to decompose crosscountry income differences into the contributions of physical capital, human capital, and total factor productivity. In U.S. data the earnings gap between immigrants and natives with identical measured skills is less than 25% for nearly all source countries, suggesting that cross-country differences in unobserved skills are much smaller than cross-country income gaps. As a result, the model strongly rejects the hypothesis that the bulk of income differences is due to physical and human capital. For a sample of countries with less than 40% of U.S. output per worker, human and physical capital account for only one-third of the income gap relative to the United States. Allowing for immigrant self-selection and skill complementarities increases this fraction to at most two-thirds. For the poorest 5 countries in the sample, this leaves income gaps of 350% unexplained. This evidence is consistent with Prescott's (1998) conclusion that accounting for cross-country income differentials requires a theory of total factor productivity. This paper offers new evidence on the sources of cross-country income differences. It exploits the idea that observing immigrant workers from different countries in the same labor market provides an opportunity to estimate their relative human capital endowments without having to adjust for other sources of country-specific productivity differences. Based on such estimates, a neoclassical growth model with human capital is used to decompose crosscountry income differences into the contributions of physical capital, human capital, and total factor productivity. In U.S. data the earnings gap between immigrants and natives with identical measured skills is less than 25% for nearly all source countries, suggesting that cross-country differences in unobserved skills are much smaller than cross-country income gaps. As a result, the model strongly rejects the hypothesis that the bulk of income differences is due to physical and human capital. For a sample of countries with less than 40% of U.S. output per worker, human and physical capital account for only one-third of the income gap relative to the United States. Allowing for immigrant self-selection and skill complementarities increases this fraction to at most two-thirds. For the poorest 5 countries in the sample, this leaves income gaps of 350% unexplained. This evidence is consistent with Prescott's (1998) conclusion that accounting for cross-country income differentials requires a theory of total factor productivity.
Introduction
Cross-country differences in per capita outputs are far larger than standard neoclassical growth models predict. In response, some authors have proposed to abandon the neoclassical framework in favor of theories where countries differ in their total factor productivities, possibly due to technology gaps (e.g., Romer 1993; Prescott 1998 ). An alternative approach, pioneered by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) , is to augment the neoclassical model by adding human capital. Since the two approaches differ dramatically in their policy implications, it is important to determine the relative contributions of human capital and total factor productivity (TFP) to cross-country income differences.
Previous attempts at resolving this issue have encountered the problem of measuring countries' human capital stocks. A common approach is to assume that workers of given age and education have the same human capital endowments in all countries (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999) . A difficulty with this approach is that possible differences in unmeasured skills are not captured. Since measured skills account for only a relatively small fraction of earnings variation within countries, this could be an important omission. An alternative approach postulates a human capital production function and constructs human capital stocks based on a perpetual inventory method (e.g., Bils and Klenow 2000) . A difficulty with this approach is that the implications may be sensitive to the human capital production function chosen.
Whether differences in human capital or in total factor productivity account for the bulk of cross-country income gaps remains therefore controversial (Topel 1998) . This paper offers a new empirical strategy which avoids these measurement problems. The idea is to estimate the human capital of workers from different countries by observing their earnings in the same labor market. Specifically, differences in labor earnings across U.S.
immigrants with identical measured skills are used to infer their unmeasured human capital endowments. 1 This approach has the benefit of capturing measured as well as unmeasured skill differences without having to impose a human capital production function.
In order to quantitatively explore this idea, I develop a neoclassical growth model that incorporates both human capital and productivity gaps as sources of cross-country income differences. The model decomposes these income differences into the contributions of 1 The idea of using international migration as a natural experiment has been proposed a number of times (Olson 1996, p. 16; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997b, p. 612) but it has apparently never been studied in detail. physical capital, observed skills (such as education and experience), unobserved skills as measured by relative immigrant earnings, and a total factor productivity residual.
Immigrant earnings are estimated from U.S. census data. A key observation is that immigrants earn roughly the same as U.S. natives with identical measured skills. For nearly all source countries, the gap between immigrant and native earnings is less than 25%, suggesting that cross-country differences in unobserved skills are much smaller than cross-country income gaps. As a result, the model strongly rejects the hypothesis that the bulk of income differences is due to physical and human capital. For a sample of countries with less than 40% of U.S. output per worker, these two factors account for only one-third of the income gap relative to the United States. The unexplained residuals are large, suggesting that average total factor productivity differs from the U.S. by a factor of more than three.
A possible objection against this approach is that immigrant self-selection could drive a wedge between the unmeasured human capital endowments of immigrants and source country workers. If immigrants are positively selected, then relative immigrant earnings overstate the human capital endowments of the source countries. However, reasonable degrees of selfselection do not alter the qualitative findings. Fully accounting for observed cross-country income differences on the basis of human and physical capital implies that immigrants must possess up to 11 times more human capital than source country workers. Yet data on the earnings of emigrants and return migrants suggest that self-selection in unobserved skills is rather modest. Allowing for reasonable degrees of self-selection, human and physical capital can account for at most 60% of cross-country income gaps. For countries with less than 40% of U.S. per capita output, this leaves an average unexplained gap between predicted and measured source country earnings of 130%.
The paper then considers whether skill complementarities could increase the ability of human capital to account for large cross-country income differences. Scarcity of skilled labor may depress unskilled wages in poor countries. This might help explain why migrants experience large earnings gains, even though unskilled workers possess the same human capital endowments in all countries. I find that such a model can account for large cross-country income differences without appealing to productivity gaps only if skill types are not highly substitutable. However, the model then implies unreasonable degrees of inequality and extremely high skill premia in poor countries. On the other hand, if substitution elasticities are high enough to avoid unreasonable skill premia, then such a model has implications that are very similar to a model with a single skill type.
I conclude that data on immigrant earnings are difficult to reconcile with the view that differences in human and physical capital account for the bulk of the observed cross-country income dispersion. The data are more consistent with Prescott's (1998) conclusion that accounting for large income differences across countries requires a theory of total factor productivity.
A number of other papers have recently offered empirical critiques of augmented neoclassical models (see Bils and Klenow 2000 , Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997a , Prescott 1998 . The main advantage of the approach taken here is that it requires few assumptions beyond those maintained in virtually all versions of neoclassical growth models (most importantly, that factors are paid their marginal products). It therefore avoids issues related to the measurement of human capital that underlie the current controversy about the importance of human capital for cross-country income differences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out the model and derives its implications for cross-country earnings differences. Section 3 describes the data and discusses measurement issues. The empirical findings are presented in section 4. The final section concludes.
The Model
This section develops a model that encompasses the two competing hypotheses about crosscountry income differences. Output per worker depends on a country's stocks of human and physical capital, as for example in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) . But it also depends on a country's level of total factor productivity as suggested by Prescott (1998) . A parameterized version of the model is used below to investigate to what extent capital accumulation can account for the large cross-country income differences observed in the data.
Each country, indexed by c, is inhabited by large numbers of workers indexed by i. Aggregate output is produced from physical capital (K c ) and labor (L c ) using a Cobb-Douglas production function
Labor input is an aggregate of skilled and unskilled labor inputs:
This specification allows for complementarity between skilled and unskilled workers while retaining a constant capital share in national income. All markets are competitive.
Firms rent physical capital and labor services from households so as to maximize period profits given factor prices. From the first order condition, the rental price of labor of skill s is
where G s denotes the derivative of G with respect to labor of skill s. Competition in factor markets ensures that effective capital-labor ratios (K c / L c ) and thus capital-output ratios (κ c = K c / Y c ) are equalized across workers within a country. Hence, the wage rates may be written as functions of labor inputs and the capital-output ratio:
Earnings per worker in country c are then given by
where N cs denotes the number of workers with skill s in c. Within a skill class, individual earnings are thus proportional to workers' endowments of labor efficiency units. In what follows I shall assume that the labor aggregator is of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution type ( )
. The labor weights are normalized such that ρ H + ρ L = 1. I also consider the special case where the skill types are perfect substitutes:
In the empirical implementation the skill types will be identified with education levels. In order to account for earnings differences within skill classes, for example by age, education or sex, the labor force is further sub-divided into J classes. Workers in classes j belonging to the set J s are endowed with h j η cj efficiency units of labor of skill type s. The h j capture relative labor efficiencies across skill classes that are common across countries, while the η cj capture the efficiency of country c workers relative to a reference country. This reference country will be the U.S. for which I normalize η US,j = 1. If the number of class j workers in country c is denoted by N cj , then country c labor endowments are given by
A number of reasons why observationally identical workers may differ in human capital levels across countries have been suggested in the literature. Examples include differences in school quality or in the human capital of teachers (Bils and Klenow 2000) . I shall refer to differences in η cj as unmeasured skill differences. In the empirical implementation, these will be estimated from immigrant earnings.
The model nests the two competing hypotheses about cross-country income differences as special cases. In order to capture their implications clearly, I define two versions of the model meant to represent the two hypotheses. The human capital model assumes that total factor productivity does not differ across countries: A c = A. The total factor productivity model assumes that unmeasured skills do not differ across countries (η cj = 1).
Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences
This section presents an empirical framework for quantifying the contributions of physical and human capital to cross-country income differences. The approach is choose parameters of the production function such that U.S. labor and capital inputs yield the earnings received by U.S.
native workers. The contributions of physical and human capital to cross-country earnings differences are then quantified by sequentially replacing the U.S. estimates of the capitaloutput ratio (κ c ), the population weights (N cj ), and the labor efficiencies (η cj ) with their source country counterparts in the production function. The implied sequence of earnings per worker, calculated from (3), decomposes the gap between U.S. and source country earnings per worker into the contributions of physical capital, measured skills and unmeasured labor efficiencies. Specifically, I define the following earnings per worker concepts:
1. Earnings per worker of skill type s in the U.S.:
Mean earnings per worker across skill types is then given by
Averages are defined in an analogous fashion for all other earnings concepts.
2. Replacing the U.S. capital-labor ratio κ US with its source country counterpart κ c yields: Strictly speaking, the predictions of the model apply only immediately after arrival in the host country. For earlier arrivals post-migration human capital investments could break the relationship between source country and immigrant earnings. However, immigrant earnings growth does not differ sufficiently from native earnings growth to make a difference. Borjas (1988) and Lubotsky (2000) estimate that immigrant earnings increase by 10-13% relative to native earnings during the first 20 years after migration. While these earnings changes are large in absolute terms, they are small compared with cross-country income differences of up to 30. It is therefore unlikely that post-migration skill investments invalidate the predictions of the human capital model. In order to verify this conjecture, I restrict the sample to immigrants who arrived at most 10 years ago and confirm that this does not significantly alter the findings reported below.
A related concern is that some skills may be not be fully transferable across borders (Friedberg 1996 
Data and Empirical Implementation
This section provides an outline of the data and empirical procedures. The appendix provides additional detail as well as data for all countries contained in my sample (see table A1 ). The objects to be estimated are the parameters of the production function (θ, A c , ρ H , ζ), the capital-output ratios (κ c ), the relative labor efficiencies of different skill classes (h j , η cj ), the degree of immigrant self-selection with respect to unmeasured skills (s c ), the population weights N cj , and source country mean earnings w cs .
Labor Efficiencies
The For each sex and country of birth workers are sorted into J = 60 classes according to age and education. The labor efficiency coefficients are calculated as mean earnings per hour in class j. For U.S. natives these represent h j , while for immigrants they represent the products η cj h j s c . Small sample sizes make it difficult to estimate immigrant earnings precisely for all J classes.
I therefore assume that η cj is the same for all classes within a given skill type (j ∈ J s ). Labor efficiencies are converted into annual earnings per worker assuming that mean hours worked equal 2,100 per year for all classes. A potential difficulty with the approach is self-selection.
The unmeasured skills of immigrants may differ from those of source country natives. In terms of the model, the s c factors could be different from one. This problem will be addressed in section 4.2.
Production Function Parameters
The productivity parameter A US is chosen to match U.S. mean earnings per worker using (3).
For the human capital model, A c = A US for all source countries. For the TFP model, A c is chosen to match predicted earnings per worker in the source countries. The labor weight ρ H matches the U.S. ratio of aggregate skilled to unskilled earnings. A normalization implies ρ L = 1 − ρ H . A number of alternative definitions of skilled versus unskilled labor and a range of substitution elasticities are explored.
The capital share parameter θ is set to a standard value of 0.33 for all countries. Gollin (1997) finds that capital shares do not systematically vary with per capita incomes. As a result, the decomposition of cross-country earnings gaps into the contributions of capital and TFP presented below also holds for cross-country income gaps. An alternative would be to assume that capital flows equalize rates of return across countries, in which case θ would be countryspecific. However, the human capital model would then imply that migration has no effect on earnings, which is at variance with evidence presented below.
Source Country Statistics
Macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP per worker and capital stocks are taken from the Penn World Tables Mark 5. 6. Capital-output ratios are taken from McGrattan and Schmitz (1998) . Lacking data on hours worked, mean annual earnings per worker are calculated as
(1−θ) times real GDP per worker. Mean earnings by skill class are the computed from the identity
together with estimates of the source country skill premia w cH / w cL . The latter are calculated from source country Mincer regressions described in the technical appendix.
Source country population weights are taken from Barro and Lee's (2000) data on educational attainment together with data on population age distributions from the U.S. Bureau of the Census International Data Base. Lacking information on the joint distribution of education and age, I assume that educational attainment is independent of age.
One important limitation of Barro and Lee's data is that educational attainment is available only for the entire population over age 15 or 25, whereas estimating source country human capital stocks requires data on the educational composition of the working population. For the U.S. this difference is small, but it appears larger for other countries. Average years of schooling estimated from worker survey data typically exceed Barro and Lee's estimates by several years, even for rich countries (see table A1 in the appendix). As a result, my estimates understate years of schooling on average by 2 years, which leads me to overstate the contribution of measured skills to cross-country earnings differences by approximately 14% (2 years of schooling times a Mincerian rate of return of 7% per year). This biases the findings reported below in favor of the human capital model.
Implications for Cross-country Earnings Differences
This section investigates to what extent human and physical capital accumulation can account for observed cross-country earnings differences. As a starting point, I consider a version of the human capital model in which the skill types are perfect substitutes and in which immigrants do not differ from source country natives in their unmeasured skills (s c = 1).
One Skill Type. No Self-Selection
The model's implications for decomposing cross-country earnings differences into the contributions of physical capital, measured and unmeasured skills are shown in Figure For poor source countries, the earnings gaps left unexplained by the model are large. Figure 2 shows the ratio of actual to predicted relative immigrant earnings ( η c c w w / or the ratio of the data shown in panel (e) of Figure 1 to the 45 degree line). In the data source country workers earn up to 11 times more than predicted by the model. On average, the model over predicts earnings of countries with less than 40% of U.S. earnings per worker more than three-fold.
Consistent with theories that attribute cross-country income differences to total factor productivity, the degree of over prediction is much larger for poorer countries.
[
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In order to quantify the explanatory power of the human capital model, I define the fraction of the measured earnings gap (w US / w c ) explained by the model, f c , as
The definition is such that f c factors of identical size explain the entire gap. For countries with relative earnings less than 40% of the U.S. the model explains 36% of the earnings gap. For the poorest 5 countries the explained fraction is only 24%. 4 Again, it should be kept in mind that this estimate is upward biased because the data probably overstate the schooling gap between the U.S. and other countries.
Other Host Countries
There are reasons to believe that similar findings are valid for a variety of host countries, not only for the United States. In particular, the observation that immigrants earn roughly the same as natives with identical measured skills is common in the literature. For example, Borjas (1988, table 6 .1) reports that the typical immigrant with 12 years of schooling at age 50 earns 9 percent more than observationally similar natives in the U.S., 10 percent less in Canada, and 5 percent less in Australia [see also Bloom and Gunderson (1991, 
Discussion
In order to understand why human and physical capital fail to account for more than half of cross-country income differences, consider the model's implications for migrant earnings gains. If there is only one skill type and if countries share identical production functions, migration affects earnings of a given worker only by changing the capital-output ratio.
Specifically, moving from country c to country s increases earnings by a factor of
according to (3). For a capital share of θ = 1/3 and a source country with onehalf the U.S. capital-output ratio, migration increases earnings by 40%. Hence, the predicted earnings gains from migration are much smaller than observed cross-country earnings differences for workers with identical measured skills, so that immigrants should earn much less than U.S. natives. By contrast, in the data their earnings are very similar.
Successfully accounting for cross-country income differences without appealing to TFP gaps therefore either requires larger earnings gains from migration or that migrants differ in their unmeasured skills from non-migrants. Below, I explore three possible reasons for this: human capital externalities, migrant self-selection and skill complementarities.
An additional challenge for the human capital model is to account for the variation of immigrant earnings across host countries. The fact that immigrants earn roughly the same as natives with the same measured skills in poor as well as in rich host countries arises naturally in the TFP model, but poses a problem for models in which productivity is embodied in workers. For example, Israel's capital-output ratio is close to that of the United States. Hence, the human capital model does not provide any reasons why the earnings of immigrants with identical measured skills should differ between Israel and the U.S. by a factor of two. Below I explore whether migrant self-selection can account for this observation.
Human Capital Spillovers
Some readers have suggested that simple modifications of the human capital model might help reconcile it with the data. One suggestion is to add country-wide human capital spillovers. Following Lucas (1988) this amounts to assuming that the productivity parameter A consists of an exogenous term shared by all countries, which may be normalized to one, and a spillover from average human capital ) ( c h : 
. Even with a generous spillover coefficient such as ξ = 1−θ, this would require that average human capital in the U.S. is up to 11 times larger than average human capital in the source countries. On the other hand, according to Figure 1 , average human capital in most source countries is at least half of the U.S. level. Reconciling the human capital model with the data therefore requires either that immigrants possess more unmeasured human capital than non-migrants (a possibility discussed in the next section) or that ξ is far above one, which is much larger than any figure proposed in the literature. Moreover, it is doubtful that the aggregate properties of model with such large spillovers would resemble those of standard neoclassical growth models. Two more promising extensions are self-selection of emigrants and skill complementarities. These are studied in detail below. 5
One Skill Type. Non-Random Selection of Migrants
A possible defense of the human capital model is that migrants are self-selected so that they possess more unmeasured human capital than non-migrants. The large earnings gap between U.S. immigrants and non-migrants in poor source countries (Figure 2) would then reflect strong self-selection instead of large earnings gains. In other words, the reason why immigrants earn up to 11 times more than predicted by the human capital model would then not be that migration leads to large earnings gains, but that immigrants possess up to 11 times more unmeasured human capital (s c ) than non-migrants with identical characteristics.
However, several pieces of evidence suggest that unmeasured self-selection is likely much smaller than necessary for reconciling the model with large cross-country earnings gaps.
Self-Selection Implied by the Model
In order to establish this point, it is first necessary to quantify the degree of self-selection implied by the human capital model, if differences in human and physical capital are to fully account for cross-country earnings gaps. Predicted source country earnings of U.S. immigrants can be calculated from (3) by applying the source country skill prices to immigrant human capital endowments:
Hence the predicted ratio of immigrant to mean source country native earnings is given by These figures are easier to interpret when expressed as the implied positions of immigrants in the source country earnings distribution. I assume that the distribution of earnings in each country is log-normal with a standard deviation that matches the quintile ratios reported in Deininger and Squire's (1996) dataset of inequality measures. The log-normal distribution approximates the earnings distributions of several countries fairly closely, except for the very highest earnings levels (Creedy 1985) . Using Deininger and Squire's inequality measures likely understates the degree of migrant self-selection implied by the model as their estimates represent income inequality across the entire population which is typically smaller than earnings dispersion among the labor force. Figure 3 shows the implied percentile position of immigrants in the source country earnings distribution. For several poor countries the model predicts that the typical immigrant to should be drawn from the top one percent of the earnings distribution.
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This strong degree of self-selection appears especially implausible for source countries with large emigrant populations. The most striking case is Jamaica, where 14.5% of the population reside in the U.S. in 1990, yet the mean immigrant must be drawn from the top 0.1% of the earnings distribution. Other countries for which the fraction of the population residing in the U.S. exceeds the predicted degree of self-selection include Guyana (15.2% vs. 0.1%), Nicaragua (4.7% vs. 4.4%), the Philippines (1.6% vs. 0.6%), and Hungary (1.1% vs. 0.2%).
Another case in which strong self-selection is unlikely is El Salvador. Funkhouser (1992) estimates that 35% of households have family members living abroad. Furthermore, he finds little self-selection of emigrants within households. Yet the human capital model implies that the 9.1% of the population residing in the U.S. in 1990 must be drawn from the top 11.1% of the earnings distribution. In these countries, accounting for cross-country earnings differences based on human and physical capital alone would require that the entire top of the earnings distribution (and only the top) has emigrated to the United States. However, other evidence leads me to conclude that self-selection in unmeasured skills is generally much weaker than the model requires.
Direct Estimates of Emigrant Self-Selection
The most direct evidence against the hypothesis of strong self-selection comes from studies that follow individual workers across borders. Based on a sample of 490 recent U.S. immigrants, Jasso et al. (1998) find that migrants on their last source country jobs earned 75% more than the mean source country worker. However, this gap is largely accounted for by differences in measured skills. Immigrants in their sample possess almost 8 years more schooling than non-migrants. With a Mincerian return to schooling of 7% per year immigrants' higher education accounts for the entire earnings gap ) 75 . 1 (
leaving little room for self-selection with respect to unmeasured skills. For Egypt Adams (1993) finds that emigrants tend to be poorer than non migrants. 6 
Return Migrants
An indirect measure of self-selection can be obtained from return migrants. If emigrants were strongly self-selected, return migrants should earn substantially more than never migrants. However, in the data the earnings of both groups are very similar, suggesting that selfselection is weak. For Hungary Co, Gang, and Yun (1999) find that female return migrants earn slightly more than never migrants whereas the difference is insignificant for male workers. Arif (1998) estimates that Pakistani return migrants earn less than those who never migrated. Barrett and O'Connell (2000) find that male return migrants in Ireland earn 10% more than never migrants, although no wage premium is found for women. For Puerto Rico Ramos (1992) finds that whether a worker is a return migrant or even whether a person was born in the U.S. has little effect on earnings. This pattern is precisely what the TFP model predicts: earnings are determined by where a person works, not by place of birth.
Of course, the fact that return migrants do not earn much more than those who never left the source countries could be due to the fact that return migrants are strongly negatively selected in terms of unmeasured skills. However, recent longitudinal studies of U.S. immigrants find that this is not the case. Lubotsky (2000) estimates that return migrants earn around 15% less than immigrants who stay in the U.S.
Estimates of Migrant Earnings Gains
Additional evidence suggesting that self-selection is weak comes from estimates of migrant earnings gains. Except for some very poor countries with unusually low capital-output ratios the human capital model predicts that immigration should raise earnings by modest amounts or even not at all. Yet empirical estimates of the earnings gains associated with migration are typically large. Jasso et al. (1998) find that, controlling for purchasing power differences, Chinese immigrants earn 3 times more in the U.S. than they did on their last home country job. By contrast, the model predicts earnings gains of only 21%. Similarly, Filipinos earn 2.5 times more in the U.S. while the model predicts an earnings improvement of only 6%. The only low income source country for which Jasso et al. (1998) do not find large earnings gains is Mexico. However, their finding contrasts with other studies, such as Cuthbert and Stevens (1981) or Massey et al. (1987) , who find that Mexican immigrants earn around six times more in the U.S. than in Mexico, compared with a predicted gain of 17%. For Puerto Ricans Ramos (1992) finds that, controlling for migrant self-selection, working in the U.S. doubles earnings, whereas the model predicts an earnings gain of only 8.4% (Melendez 1994 has similar findings). Large earnings gains due to migration are also found for Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia (around 800%; Pasha and Altaf 1987) and in the Middle East (Ilahi and Jafarey 1999) , and for Egyptian emigrants (Adams 1993) . This evidence suggests that migrating from poor to rich countries results in earnings gains that are considerably larger than the human capital model predicts.
A possible way of reconciling the human capital model with large immigrant earnings gains is self-selection based on job matches. 7 If migration occurs because workers have received attractive job offers, then the earnings gap between immigrants and source country natives may in part reflect the high quality of immigrant job matches instead of differences in human capital. Consistent with this hypothesis, De Silva (1997) finds that immigrants who are admitted into Canada with pre-arranged employment enjoy higher earnings. However, the estimated earnings benefit of 17% accounts for only a small fraction of the unexplained gap between immigrant and source country earnings. Moreover, only around one in five Canadian immigrants arrive with pre-arranged employment.
A related concern is that skill-based admissions could induce strong immigrant self-selection. This could be a problem for countries such as Canada, which admits around 40% of immigrants based on skill or employment criteria. However, it is much less of a concern for the U.S. where since the 1965 Immigration Act the bulk of immigrants are admitted as relatives or family members of U.S. residents. The fraction of skill-based admissions never exceeded 16% during the period 1988-1998 and most of these come from rich source countries (INS Yearbook 1998) . Moreover, while skill-based immigrants enjoy an initial earnings advantage over family migrants, the gap vanishes after some years of U.S. experience (Duleep and Regets 1996; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1995) .
Comparison of Host Countries
A final reason to doubt the hypothesis of strong self-selection is that the human capital model fails to rationalize the patterns of self-selection it implies. In the data, immigrants from all source countries earn roughly the same as observationally similar natives in all host countries. Reconciling the human capital model with the data then requires (i) that immigrants from poorer countries are more positively selected (as measured in Figure 2) ; (ii) that immigrants in poorer host countries are less positively selected. Thus, the model implies an elaborate pattern of self-selection, yet it predicts that migrants have no incentives for such self-selection. Instead, the earnings gains experienced by all migrants from a given source country are predicted to be identical:
. This evidence leads me to conclude that selfselection with respect to unmeasured skills does not provide a plausible reconciliation of the human capital model with the data.
A model in which productivity is not embodied in workers offers a more parsimonious explanation for immigrant earnings across source and host countries. Since immigrants benefit from host country total factor productivity in the same way as native workers, immigrants earn more in richer host countries. And the relationship between source country and immigrant earnings is weak because migrants leave source country total factor productivity behind when they emigrate.
Multiple Skill Types
In neoclassical growth models, it is typically assumed that workers of different skill levels are perfect substitutes in production. Relaxing this assumption might help reconcile the model with the data. If skilled and unskilled labor are poor substitutes, countries where skilled labor is scarce may have low average earnings, even though a typical unskilled worker possesses the same amount of human capital in all countries. Migration then leads to large wage gains for unskilled workers because they benefit from the larger supply of skilled labor in the host country. 8 This section argues that such a model does not help reconcile human capital theory with immigrant earnings data because it implies unreasonably high skill premia and earnings inequality in poor countries.
Empirical Implementation
In order to empirically implement the model with two skill types, it is necessary to define which education classes belong to each skill. Barro and Lee's (2000) data distinguish seven education classes for the source countries (no formal schooling; primary, secondary or higher schooling attained or completed). A common approach is to count only college graduates as skilled. For this case Krusell et al. (2000) estimate a substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled labor of 1.67. However, when applied across countries, these parameters yield skill premia in poor countries that are up to 10 times larger than in the United States. Obtaining reasonable skill premia requires a broader definition of skill and a higher substitution elasticity. In what follows I define workers with at least completed secondary education as skilled. The substitution elasticity is set to 5, so that the model matches the mean skill premium in source countries with earnings below 40% of the U.S. level. Experimentation with alternative skill definitions or substitution elasticities either reduces the explanatory power of the model or results in unreasonable skill premia.
The implications of the two-skill model for source country earnings are shown in figure 4 . Comparing the findings with those of figure 1 for the one-skill model reveals that imperfect substitutability of skills alters the findings in only minor ways. The gaps between source country earnings in the data and the model predictions, shown in figure 5, are roughly as large as those found in the one-skill model. The implied degrees of immigrant self-selection are therefore nearly as high as in the one-skill case. The average fraction of cross-country earnings differences explained by the model rises to 44%, compared with 36% for the one-skill model.
The reason for the small improvement is the high substitution elasticity of skilled and unskilled labor. However, the skill premia predicted for poor countries are, on average, close to those calculated from source country Mincer regressions. This indicates that reducing the substitution elasticity substantially below 5 would lead to unreasonable skill premia. To illustrate, reducing the substitution elasticity to 3 increases the fraction of earnings differences accounted for by the model only slightly to 51%, but raises skill premia roughly 50% above those observed in the data.
I conclude that imperfect skill substitution does not substantially improve the explanatory power of the model. Fully accounting for cross-country earnings differences on the basis of physical and human capital accumulation implies either implausible degrees of self-selection or unreasonable skill premia. 
Multiple Unobserved Skill Types
The previous section has shown that imperfect skill substitution does not help reconcile the model with large cross-country earnings differentials, if skill is identified with education. In this section I argue that the same holds true, if skill types are not observed by the econometrician. The model then has a number of free parameters, such as the fraction of skilled workers in each country, but is still unable to generate large cross-country income differences without implying that a small fraction of skilled workers receive the bulk of total earnings in poor countries.
Empirical Implementation
In order to evaluate this case empirically, I specialize the two-skill model as follows. Each worker of skill s is endowed with η cs h cs units of labor of type s. As before, h cs represents measured skills; it should be thought of as the mean of h cj over classes j ∈ J s . The factor η cs represents unmeasured skills as estimated from relative immigrant earnings. Hence, the labor endowments of country c are L cs = η cs h cs N cs . Choosing units of skilled and unskilled labor allows me to normalize h US,s = η US,s = 1. The skill-premium in country c is then given by the ratio of skilled to unskilled earnings per worker:
The skill premium relative to the U.S. is then
The share of aggregate earnings received by skilled workers is given by
The empirical approach is to calculate the fractions of skilled workers (n cH = N cH / N c ) required to generate a relative income level of 05 . 0 / = US c y y , which roughly corresponds to the poorest country in my dataset. I then compare the share of aggregate earnings received by the skilled and the relative skill premium with sensible upper bounds from the data. In order to solve for the fraction of skilled workers, write per worker output of country c relative to the U.S. as
Given parameters of the production function, this can be solved for n cH . In order to maximize the part of the income gap accounted for by physical capital, I set the capital-output ratio to one quarter of the U.S. value. Lower capital-output ratios are hard to justify empirically (McGrattan and Schmitz 1998). The capital share is set to θ = 1/3. The data shown in figure 4 provide estimates of source country skill levels. The fact that U.S. immigrants from nearly all source countries earn at least 75 percent of native earnings, places a lower bound on a weighted average of η cH and η cL . Given that earnings inequality is not systematically higher for immigrants from poor source countries, η cL cannot be much lower than η cH . I therefore set η cH = η cL = 0.75. 9 Since measured skills in the poorest source countries average 60% of the U.S. level, I set h cs = 0.6.
This leaves three parameters undetermined: n US,H , ρ H , and ζ. However, it is shown next that even with three free parameters it is not possible to generate low per capita incomes without unreasonable degrees of earnings inequality.
Findings
A key parameter for this model is the substitution elasticity between skill types. If it is set too low, the model implies extremely large skill premia and earnings inequality. On the other hand, setting the elasticity too high makes it hard or even impossible to reduce source country earnings to the target level. Below I present results for an elasticity of 2.5. For the free parameters ρ H and n US,H I explore a range of values. Table 2 shows the fractions of skilled workers in the source countries consistent with the desired output level, while table 3 shows the fraction of aggregate earnings received by these workers. The ratio of the source country skill premium to that of the U.S. is shown in table 4.
If skill premia more than 5 times larger than in the U.S. are considered unreasonable, then only entries with n US,H ≤ 0.85 and ρ H ≥ 0.85 need to be considered. On the other hand, ρ H ≥ 0.95 or n US,H < 0.5 imply unreasonable degrees of inequality for the U.S., such as skill premia of at least 10. This leaves only combinations of ρ H = 0.85 and n US,H between 0.5 and 0.85. If n US,H = 0.5, then 3.8% high skilled workers receive 45% of aggregate source country earnings. On the other hand, if n US,H = 0.85, then 8% skilled workers receive 57% of aggregate earnings. For comparison, in a sample of U.S. native full-time workers the top 5 percent received 18.5 percent of aggregate earnings in 1990. In both cases, the skill premia are more than 3 times larger than in the United States. Such values are implausible, especially given that in the data not all earnings variation is due to unmeasured skills that are lacking in poor source countries. Varying the substitution elasticity between unskilled and skilled labor does not alter these conclusions. If skills are more easily substitutable, the skill premium is reduced for a given fraction of skilled workers. On the other hand, the values of n cH required to reduce source country earnings to the desired level shrink even further.
Note further that for parameter values such as those underlying table 2 the model is difficult to reconcile with immigrant earnings data. It implies that in the U.S. almost all workers are skilled and that the unskilled earn only at most third of the skilled (and thus, approximately, of average earnings). Since in the data immigrants do not earn much less than natives, it must be the case that almost all immigrants are skilled as well, which means that the average immigrant must be drawn from the top 8 percent of the source country earnings distribution. Yet, the incentives for migration are overwhelmingly larger for the unskilled.
Moreover, the implications of such a model are closer to those of a TFP model than to those of a human capital model along the lines of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) . Small amounts of skilled migration from rich to poor countries would generate large increases in world output. Opportunities for rapid convergence exist because the returns to skill accumulation must be high in poor countries. I conclude that scarcity of skilled workers is not an empirically plausible explanation for low per capita incomes.
[INSERT TABLES 2, 3, 4 HERE]
Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences
The final task is to develop estimates of the fractions of cross-country income differences due to human and physical capital accumulation. The definitions of these fractions are analogous to (4). For example, the fraction accounted for by physical capital, In all cases I report the mean fraction explained for countries with at most 40% of U.S. per capita GDP. Physical capital accumulation accounts for 9.3% of cross-country earnings differences, which confirms the well-known finding that physical capital alone cannot account for large income gaps.
The contribution of human capital depends on the substitution elasticity between skill types. Consider first the case of one skill type. The joint contribution of physical capital and measured skills is then 30.1%. These values correspond to the earnings ratios shown in figure  1 . However, it is important to keep in mind that these values are likely too large because educational attainment in poor countries is under-estimated in the Barro-Lee (2000) data.
In order to quantify the role played by unmeasured skills, it is necessary to estimate immigrant self-selection (s c ). Based on the evidence presented earlier suggesting that self-selection in unmeasured skills is likely weak, a sensible point estimate for unmeasured skill differences is given by relative immigrant earnings (η cj ). Since immigrants earn roughly the same as natives, the fraction explained by unmeasured skills is then only 5.8%. Overall, the human capital model accounts for 35.9% of cross-country earnings differences, leaving a mean earnings gap of 132% unexplained. For the poorest 5 countries in the sample, this gap increases to almost 400% so that the model over predicts earnings in these countries by a factor of 5. In the two-skill model the contribution of human capital is slightly larger. Physical capital and measured skills together account for 37.8% of measured earnings gaps. The overall fraction accounted for by the model is 44.7%, leaving a mean earnings gap of 96% unaccounted for (249% for the poorest 5 countries in the sample).
These findings are directly comparable to those of Hall and Jones (1999) . Except for the method of measuring human capital, their accounting framework is the same as the one described in section 2. As a result, their estimates of the contribution of physical capital to cross-country output differences are close to mine. Hall and Jones estimate human capital stocks based on Mincer regressions that are common to all countries together with mean years of schooling taken from an earlier version of Barro and Lee's data. Figure 6 plots their estimates of human capital per worker relative to the U.S. against those derived here for the one-skill model. In spite of this very different estimation method, the two estimates are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.82). The fractions of cross-country income gaps explained by both measures are also close. For countries with less than 40% of U.S. per capita output, Hall and Jones's human capital estimates account for 36% of output gaps, while my estimates account for 27%. It is easy to see why the two estimates are close. Hall and Jones's estimation framework assumes that the human capital endowments of workers with identical schooling are the same in all countries. The approach pursued here estimates these human capital endowments from immigrant earnings, but reaches a similar conclusion.
Based on a slightly different Mincer specification, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) estimate that physical and human capital account for between one-third and two-thirds of measured differences in output per worker, depending on assumptions about the production and measurement of human capital. 10
Developing an upper bound for the contribution of physical and human capital to crosscountry income differences requires a proxy for unmeasured self-selection. Given the evidence reviewed earlier, it seems safe to conclude that unmeasured self-selection is not stronger than measured self-selection. An upper bound for unmeasured self-selection may then be obtained by setting the s c factors equal to the ratio of measured skills of immigrants relative to source country natives (the first term in equation (5)). For the poorest 5 source countries, this implies that immigrants have more than three times more human capital than source country workers, which places them in the top 8% of the source country earnings distribution. The fraction explained by the human capital model then rises to 60.1% in the one-skill case and to 68.2% in the two-skill case. Still, the unexplained earnings gaps remain large. For countries below 40% of U.S. earnings per worker, the model over predicts mean earnings by 130% (95% in the case of two skills).
There are reasons to believe that these figures overstate the importance of human capital. For reasons discussed earlier, the Barro-Lee data likely overstate the gap in measured skills between the source countries and the United States. This bias also affects the proxy for unmeasured selection. In sum, a sensible point estimate for the fraction of cross-country earnings differences due to human and physical capital is around one-third. A generous upper bound for this fraction is two-thirds.
Conclusion
This paper offers new evidence on the sources of cross-country income differences. It exploits the idea that immigrant workers provide an opportunity to estimate the human capital 10 Their measure of the explained fraction is the regression coefficient of measured on predicted output per worker, given identical total factor productivities in all countries. This is similar to the measure used here, which may be written as
. Hence, if f c were the same for all countries, it could be estimated by regressing log measured earnings on log predicted earnings. endowments of workers from a variety of source countries based on earnings attained in a common labor market. This approach captures both observed and unobserved skill differences without having to postulate a particular human capital production function. Immigrant earnings data suggest that cross-country differences in unobserved skills are much smaller than cross-country income gaps. As a result, my estimates strongly reject the hypothesis that human and physical capital account for the bulk of cross-country income differences. For countries with less than 40% of U.S. output per worker I find that human and physical capital account for only one-third of the income gap relative to the United States. Allowing for immigrant self-selection and skill complementarities increases this fraction to at most twothirds. Earnings in the poorest 5 countries in the sample are over predicted by a factor of 3.5. This evidence is consistent with Prescott's (1998) conclusion that accounting for crosscountry income differentials requires a theory of total factor productivity. Schmidt, Christoph (1998 Venturini, Alessandra; Claudia Villosio (1998). "Foreign workers in Italy: Are they assimilating to natives? Are they competing against natives? An analysis by the SSA dataset." Mimeo. Observations are sorted into the following classes:
Tables
• Years of schooling: 0-4, 5-8, 9-11, 12, 13-14, 15+.
• Age: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 64-69. • Sex: Male or female.
• Birth place: According to Penn World Table country codes.
Earnings Variables. Annual work hours are calculated from "weeks worked last year" and "hours usually worked per week." Labor earnings are calculated from "wage and salary income" which does not include self-employment income.
Education Variables. The variable "educational attainment" gives years of schooling in an intervalled format. Each person is assigned its interval midpoint as years of schooling.
Source Country Data
Data on source country aggregates are generally taken from the Penn World Table Mark For the two-skill model it is necessary to calculate source country earnings by skill type.
Mincer regressions are used to calculate the relative earnings of skilled to unskilled workers in the source countries. Psacharopoulos (1994) provides sources for a large number of countries, A-8 which are updated in Bils and Klenow (2000) . Only earnings regressions that do not control for additional variables which might be correlated with education/experience are used.
Moreover, the underlying samples must be representative for a significant fraction of the source country work force. Additional detail is provided in a Technical Appendix which is available from the author's web site.
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